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INTRODUCTION
Betrayal and disloyalty are grievous moral wrongs, yet today
when the disloyal commit treason we seem reluctant to punish them.
John Walker Lindh fought for the Taliban with full knowledge that it
was engaged in hostilities against the United States.1 It should not
have been so difficult to prove by two witnesses to the overt act, as
the Constitution requires, that he adhered to the enemy giving them
aid and comfort.' Admittedly, there were legal problems about
whether the Taliban as an indirect enemy in an undeclared war could
qualify as the enemy in the constitutional sense.3 But there was the
alternative clause of "waging war against the United States," which a
soldier armed and fighting for the Taliban presumably did.4 The
reasons for not prosecuting Lindh for treason had little to do with the
technical requirements of the offense. Many in Washington regarded
him as a confused kid following his religious commitments without
* George P. Fletcher is a Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at the Columbia University
School of Law.
1. Neil A. Lewis, Admitting He Fought in Taliban, American Agrees to 20-Year
Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al.
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. The literature on treason is scant. The subject is
discussed in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 41-60 (1993); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE
UNITED STATES (1971); REBECCA WEST, THE MEANING OF TREASON (1947).
3. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
4. The classic application of this clause was in the rebellion of Aaron Burr, in which
Burr was acquitted in a trial presided over by Chief Justice John Marshall. See GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM
122-25 (2002).
1612 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
responsibility for the larger military conflict.' They did not have the
will to label him a traitor and punish him accordingly.
Treason still carries the death penalty,6 but that sanction is of
dubious constitutionality. The Supreme Court has struck down the
death penalty in cases where it was imposed for crimes less heinous
than homicide.7 And though some might think that disloyalty is
worse than homicide (and apparently it was in Renaissance Italy),8
that strong view of the crime is not likely to prevail today.
The mood now is better characterized as ambivalence. We
supposedly hate treason, but we are unsure whether and how we
should punish it. The last time the government prosecuted acts of
adhering to the enemy was during World War 11. 9 Our contemporary
ambivalence is expressed in opting for restrictive interpretations of
key elements in the crime. According to a persuasive line of cases,
the concept of the "enemy" applies only to enemies in a declared
war.1" The armies of North Korea, North Vietnam, the Taliban,
Afghanistan, Iraq-none of these met the technical standard of being
enemies in a declared war. Indeed, with the entire congressional
practice of declaring war in limbo, one wonders whether we will ever
witness another American war formally declared in advance.1'
Why are we so ambivalent about treason? Why threaten the
supreme penalty and then look for excuses not to apply the law? My
thesis is that because of its feudal origins, treason no longer conforms
to our shared assumptions about the liberal nature and purpose of
criminal law. Our ambivalence about treason corresponds to
legislative moves made in other countries to convert the offense into
5. The former President George Bush referred to him as a "misguided Marin County
hot-tubber." Marc Sandalow, Why U.S. Was Forced into a Plea Deal; Trial Might Expose
Anti-Terror Secrets, S.F. CHRON., July 16,2002, at A8.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
7. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (holding the death penalty
unconstitutional as imposed for rape).
8. See Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante's Inferno and the Social
Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 788 (2001).
9. See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 632-36 (1947). In an earlier stage of this
case, the three male defendants received sentences of death; the females received terms of
twenty-five years imprisonment. United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1943)
(reversing on technical grounds); cf United States v. Cramer, 325 U.S. 1 passim (1945)
(reviewing another World War II era treason trial).
10. See United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (noting that German
forces became enemies upon the outbreak of war between the United States and the
German Empire); United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863)
(No. 15,254) (holding rebels in Confederate states not enemies under the Treason Clause).
11. The last time Congress declared war was the day after Pearl Harbor, December 8,
1941. Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795, 795.
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a crime with liberal contours. These are the claims I intend to
establish in this paper. First we need to review the basics of treason
in Anglo-American law and clarify the conceptual nature of liberal
and feudal theories of law. Then we turn to the problem of
reconciling treason with a liberal legal culture.
I. TREASON IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW
The original English treason statute of 25 Edward III (1351)
expressed the spirit of the feudal system by grounding the crime in a
personal relationship to King or Queen.' 2 Treason was committed
"when a man doth compass or imagine the death of our Lord the
King, or of our Lady his Queen." 3 Beyond this core duty, the crime
extended to various acts that could threaten the continuity of the
royal house. For example, it was also treason to compass the death of
the King's "eldest Son and heir" or to "violate the King's Companion,
or the King's eldest Daughter unmarried, or the Wife of the King's
eldest Son and heir."'
4
Beyond these attacks on the bloodline, the 1351 statute
contained language familiar to us from the United States
Constitution, for it was also treason "if a man do levy War against our
Lord the King in his Realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in
his Realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the Realm or
elsewhere."' 5 It is worth noting that the adaptation of this ancient
formula in the Constitution dropped the distinction between levying
war inside and outside the realm and refers generally to the enemies
of the United States, not just enemies within the realm. The original
treason statute seems to blur the line between internal and external
threats to the state. All threats to the royal house were regarded
under the same label. We shall see, however, that the distinction
between sedition (overthrowing the government) and treason (as
attachment to a foreign power) is fundamental to understanding the
nature of the latter.
I will come back to this problem of distinguishing between
overthrowing the government and treasonous disloyalty, but first we
should note some other peculiar features of the 1351 statute that
stamp it as a feudal document. The most intriguing is the definition
12. Statue of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2.
13. Id. Similar language is found in the Bible. See Ecclesiastes 10:20 (New
International Version 1984) ("Do not revile the King even in your thoughts .....
14. Statue of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2.
15. Id.
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of petty treason, long since forgotten, that applies "when a servant
slayeth his Master, or a Wife her husband, or when a man secular or
religious slayeth his Prelate, to whom he oweth Faith and
Obedience.' 1 6 That these cases of homicide were regarded as a
version of treason tells us something important about the original
understanding of the crime. These are clearly hierarchical duties
owed by the lower-standing members of society, servants, wives, and
lay people, each relative to someone of higher-standing. The breach
of the hierarchical duty expresses the feudal nature of the crime.
There was an element of reciprocity in the feudal structure, but
not in the kinds of duties owed. The masters, husbands, and prelates
bore duties to those below them, but they were presumably duties to
provide protection, security, and care. They were not duties of
submission and fealty. They were not ways of expressing
subordination to the feudal structure. The homicidal acts that also
constituted petty treason threatened the feudal order.17  If a
subservient person could kill a superior, then anybody might kill the
King.
The criteria of petty treason illuminate an important feature of
"high" treason that is simply assumed. Only persons standing in a
relationship of subordination could commit petty treason. The crime
was not killing a prelate but killing him if you owed him a special duty
of obedience.
The same must have been true about treason against the King.
No one would have argued that a Frenchman who compassed the
death of the English king would have been guilty of treason. Yet
curiously the Statute is not addressed to subjects loyal to the English
crown but to all persons. The personal relationship to the Crown was
simply assumed.
The United States Constitution both built on and restricted the
English conception of treason. Because the signers of the
Declaration of Independence thought of themselves as having
committed treason against the Crown, they sought to confine the
offense to its core cases: "Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."'" The two witness
requirement was added to provide procedural protection. Curiously,
however, there is no reference in Article III to the shared common
16. Id.
17. The feudal order was expressed primarily in the system of land law.
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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law assumption that only persons who owe a duty of loyalty to the
United States can commit treason against "them" or, as we say in the
postbellum period, treason against "it"-the United States as a
singular entity. Correcting the omission in the Constitution, the
United States Code adds the requirement of "owing allegiance to the
United States" as a condition for committing treason.1 9
There has been some hesitation about defining the range of
persons who owe a duty of loyalty to the United States or indeed to
any republic. The assumption of the feudal system was that everyone
in the realm, and therefore part of the feudal system, owed a duty of
fealty to the king as person and as head of the house that would
remain in power after the present king's death. But it is not so easy,
as a theoretical matter, to formulate the criteria on which the
republican version of the crime should depend. Should the relevant
nexus be citizenship, permanent residence, domicile, employment in
the state, physical presence, or perhaps even owning property within
the jurisdiction?
Citizenship is the default candidate, but it is fraught with
problems. The entire institution of passports and citizenship is of
rather recent vintage, and we are speaking here of an ancient crime.
Also, whether someone is a citizen or not may often depend on
accidents of birth and migration. The case of William Joyce (Lord
Haw-Haw) illustrates the problem.2" Joyce grew up in England, but
because he was not born there, he was not a citizen. Joyce was born
in Brooklyn and became an American citizen. His father was Irish,
and Joyce grew up in Ireland and England. He used his perfect
English accent to make radio broadcasts on behalf of the Germans
during the Second World War. There was little doubt that when he
was brought to trial at Old Bailey the Court would find a rationale for
hanging him as a traitor. But the legal argument was not simple.
Joyce was not a citizen, and therefore it was not clear why he owned
allegiance to the United Kingdom. The Court relied upon his once
having applied for and received a passport from the United Kingdom
as a basis for estoppel: if he once had a passport and the protection of
the Crown abroad, he could not be heard to deny his duty of loyalty.
21
One reason why the criterion of duty is so difficult to fathom in
the theory of treason is that we do not know to whom the duty is
owed. Absent the personal relationship to "our lord the King," who
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
20. Joyce v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions, 1946 A.C. 347 (H.L.).
21. Id. at 368-72.
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or what is at the other end of relationship that is betrayed in an act of
treason? The duty is surely not to the President or the government,
and one would be hard pressed to find any other surrogate in modern
liberal democracies for personal duties to the Crown.
A clue to the proper way of speaking about this duty is found in
the old Communist name for treason: izmena rodine, or "betrayal of
the motherland."22 The notions of motherland and fatherland are
critical to understanding the meaning of treason in a world without
feudal duties of fealty to King or Queen. These terms represent a
personification of the country or the nation and therefore enable us
to speak of a personal relationship between the individual and the
collective within which he or she lives.
The only problem is that Americans do not use the language of
motherland or fatherland. I am not even sure, if we had to choose,
whether we would prefer the feminine form, as do Russians, or the
masculine, as do Germans. Even the current fashion of speaking of
"homeland security" does not satisfy the need for an object of loyalty.
No one is expected to be loyal to the homeland per se. The most we
could possibly say is that the duty is owed to the American nation. In
the name of the American nation, Lincoln insisted that the
Confederacy could not secede and then delivered his famous eulogy
over the dead in Gettysburg.23
I am always puzzled by the apparent unwillingness of Americans
to be clear about the distinction between nationhood and citizenship.
The terms are used interchangeably in American discourse. True, the
Constitution refers only to "foreign nations" and not to the American
nation.24  And there are many who are willing to recognize that
Germans and Italians constitute nations, but insist that Americans do
not. The idea seems to be that the Old World nations are extensions
of tribal identities, but that immigration-based societies cannot have
the same shared identity based on ancestral bloodlines. This is a
shortsighted view.
By linguistic provenance, the idea of the nation must have
something to do with being born (from the Latin nasci, to be born).
22. The 1960 Criminal Code of the former Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic refers to treason in article 64 as izmena rodine or "betrayal of the motherland."
23. I have explored the relevance of nationhood in Lincoln's thinking in GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 57-74 (2001).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing for congressional authority "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes"). American Indians were commonly called nations-the Cherokee nation, etc.-
suggesting an implicit assumption between attribution of nationhood and ethnic otherness.
1616 [Vol. 82
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My suggestion is that the nation consists of people who are born into
the national experience, absorb the language and culture, and share a
communal imagination .2  Naturalized citizens are accepted on the
basis of absorbing the language and the rudiments of the Constitution
and their sworn commitment to uphold the basic ideals of the culture.
This is certainly the way Lincoln thought of the American nation in
the Gettysburg Address where he repeatedly referred to the North
and the South as one nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to
the proposition that all men are created equal. 2 6 Since the late
nineteenth century schoolchildren have been pledging allegiance to
"one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all," and since 1954
they have used the phrase "one nation under God." If the Americans
were not a nation "four score and seven years" before Lincoln spoke
at Gettysburg, their historical experience had made them into an
organic entity comparable to the great nations of Europe.
American "nationhood" is an indispensable feature of the
American self-understanding. No other concept could fit into the
things that we say about ourselves, such as being a "nation under
God" or constituting "an indivisible nation. ' 27 It makes little sense to
talk about "states under God" or "indivisible states." But the idiom
of the nation fits appropriately into these syntactical contexts. As the
king claimed to derive his power from God, the nation claims to stand
under God. This is surely the way Lincoln thought about Americans,
a people he once described as "His almost chosen people.
'28
Admittedly, before the Civil War, it was common to invoke the
notion of an indivisible Union, as Daniel Webster unforgettably
orated in 1830: "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and
inseparable! 29 Significantly, after the Gettysburg Address, American
rhetoric focused on the nation instead of the Union. It would be odd,
for example, to rewrite the Pledge of Allegiance so that it ended in a
peroration to "one Union indivisible, under God."
The nation is an idea that has come into its own precisely to
explain what it means to be a republic (res-publica) instead of a
25. On nineteenth century theories of nationhood espoused by Orestes Brownson and
Francis Lieber, see generally FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 64-74.
26. For a more extensive analysis of the Gettysburg Address, see FLETCHER, supra
note 23, at 35-56.
27. These phrases, now part of the Pledge of Allegiance, originated in Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, November 19,1863. See id. at 45, 50-52.
28. Id. at 39-40, 49-53; WILLIAM WOLF, THE ALMOST CHOSEN PEOPLE: A STUDY
OF THE RELIGION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 161-71 (1959).
29. Daniel Webster, Union Address (Jan. 26, 1830), http://www.nv.cc.va.us/
home/nvsageh/Hist12l/Part3/Webster.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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monarchy. Who is the publica to whom the res belongs? It is not
very satisfying to say that the state belongs to its citizens for
citizenship is conferred and subject to removal by the government
acting for the state. (It would be like saying that the corporation
belonged to its stockholders even if the corporate board could decide
who held stock and for how long.)
In order to legitimate the state, something or someone must
precede it and give birth to it. In the American idiom, the precursor
to the constitutional state was "We the people," and surely the people
existed before the Constitution, otherwise it would make no sense for
the people to enter into a more perfect union. The German Basic
Law of 1949 speaks of the German Volk [nation, people] as the agent
giving the Federal Republic its new Constitution.3" We cannot
account for the legitimacy of the state without invoking some
ontologically antecedent notion of the nation or the people.
The conclusion to which we are led is that treason is a crime
committed by members of a nation against the nation itself.3' So
defined, treason is a relational crime, committed only by persons who
stand in a specific relationship to others. Other crimes of the same
form are adultery and child neglect. Only spouses can commit
adultery, and only parents and guardians can engage in child neglect.
Also in this category are some crimes committed by public officials
under special duties to the public. We should call these relational
crimes for they are not subject to being committed by anyone against
anyone.
Among these relational crimes, we should note an important
difference in the power and status of the offender. In the case of
treason, the crime is committed by the subordinated subject against a
superior. Adultery is more complicated. Under Jewish law, wives
committed the crime against husbands but not vice versa,32 but in the
book of Genesis, foreign potentates committed or risked committing
the crime against Abraham and then Isaac.33 In child abuse, the
30. The Preamble to the 1949 German Grundgesetz or "Basic Law," the constitution
of post-war Germany, refers to the German Volk as both the agent and the recipient of
the constitution.
31. The statutory definition of treason is ambiguous on this point. The commission of
treason is limited to persons "owing allegiance to the United States," but it is unclear
whether the United States is understood as a state or a nation. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
Citizenship is not necessary to "owe allegiance."
32. See Deuteronomy 22:22; THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 488 (Menachem Elon
ed., 1974).
33. In the story pattern in Genesis 12:10-20, 20:1-17, 26:6-10, a Patriarch lies and
claims that his wife is his sister. A foreign potentate takes or begins to take the alleged
[Vol. 821618
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power relationship is reversed: parents commit the crime by
endangering their dependents. The same reversal is clear in cases of
crimes by public officials against the public interest.34 To affix the
label "feudal" in discussing relational crimes, therefore, we should
limit ourselves to the cases in which a subordinate is under special
duties of respect and loyalty toward a superior. This was true in
history of treason and partially true in the history of adultery.
In the literature of criminal law, treason was always considered
something of an "outlier." However central it might have been to the
interests of the state, it was never taken to be the paradigmatic
offense for understanding the general elements of criminal liability
(harm, actus reus, mens rea). Casebooks ignore the offense. Treatise
writers show little interest.35 The tendency to ignore treason in
theorizing about criminal law testifies to its atavistic character. It is a
feudal crime surviving in a post-Enlightenment criminal law based on
liberal principles of harm, privacy of the internal sphere, and
universality. These features of the liberal theory of criminal law
require further elaboration.
II. LIBERAL CRIMINAL LAW
We take it for granted that the basic criminal offenses-e.g.,
homicide, rape, burglary, robbery-are subject to commission by
anyone and against anyone. They are universal on the side both of
the perpetrator and the victim. The harm principle is an aspect of this
universality. In John Stewart Mill's memorable formula, the state
should intervene to punish conduct only when it causes or threatens
to cause imminent harm.36 The premise underlying Mill's claim is that
the harm occurs not just to the insiders in a particular nation or group
but to anyone. Offenses in a liberal legal culture begin on the
assumption that there is a human victim and that this victim, in the
words of Joel Feinberg, has suffered a setback to his or her interests. 7
Attempts and other prophylactic offenses are tolerated as
modifications of this basic requirement of harm as a condition for
sister as his own wife and then by a variety of means discovers that she is already married.
The mistaken adultery is considered a grave sin--on the part of the foreign male!
34. My favorite case is a crime of Public Disloyalty [Untreue]. § 266
STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB]. The crime consists in abusing public trust.
35. I addressed these issues originally in George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41
MD. L. REV. 193 (1982).
36. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10-11 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859).
37. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-64 (1984).
2004] 1619
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liability.
The harm principle implies the same harm should be the basis of
punishment regardless of the identify of the victim. Thus the harm
principle, as an expression of a liberal and universal system of
criminal justice, excludes parochial crimes directed toward specifically
marked groups, such as crimes directed only against women or blacks.
The crimes of genocide at the international level3" and hate crimes in
the United States39 arguably do not run afoul of this principle, for
although they are directed toward racial, national, religious, or ethnic
groups, they are designed to protect all such groups defined by the
same characteristics."
A crime that arguably does offend the liberal principle of
universality is the current definition of war crimes in the United
States. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2441, there is a punishment for war crimes
as defined in the Geneva Conventions but only if "the person
committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a
member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of
the United States."'" It looks as though this statute is designed to
criminalize only crimes committed by and against Americans, but a
more careful reading suggests another interpretation. The limitation
to American nationals is not substantive but jurisdictional. Although
some countries claim universal jurisdiction over war crimes wherever
and by whomever committed, 42 the United States does not. The
reference to national identity of perpetrators and victims in § 2441 is a
jurisdictional limitation on the prosecution of war crimes. The
premises are the active and passive nationality principles, which
authorize criminal punishment under international law only if a
country's nationals either commit the offense or suffer the offense as
victims.
43
It is important, then, to distinguish universality in the substantive
38. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 6, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004 (1998).
39. Penalty enhancement for hate crimes was upheld in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 479 (1993).
40. The text says "arguably" because the crimes are subject to criticism that they
protect some groups and not others, i.e. they protect religious but not political minorities.
For an analysis of these offenses as examples of collective criminality, see George P.
Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective
Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1522-26 (2002).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (2000). "[N]ational of the United States" is defined in
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2000).
42. See VOLKERSTRAFGESETZBUCH [VstGB].
43. The locus classicus of these restrictions on jurisdiction is S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Sept. 7).
[Vol. 821620
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definition of the offense from universality of jurisdiction. The former
focuses on every individual as perpetrator and victim, the latter
defines the range of cases on which the court will claim the
competence to adjudicate liability for the crime. If you look at the
definition of homicide in any state of the United States, the definition
purports to cover all persons in the world, both as perpetrators and as
victims. It is only elsewhere in the statutes and cases that you learn
that the states insist on the territorial principle, namely that the crime
occurs or its effects be felt in the state itself."
Against this background of the principles guiding the
development of criminal law, we can recognize easily that treason
displays two anti-liberal characteristics. First, the crime is addressed
to the bond of loyalty between a particular sovereign and subordinate
subjects. Second, the mental actions of compassing or lusting in one's
heart45 as the core of the crime violate the harm principle.46 The
gravamen of the crime shifts from external action to internal
attitudes.
Both of these anti-liberal features of treason were commonplace
in Fascist criminal theory as it became influential under National
Socialism. A leading scholar of the period wrote that treason was the
paradigm for all crime: betrayal of the Volk was the essential
wrong.47 Also, the emphasis on internal attitudes as opposed to
external conduct is associated with National Socialist criminal theory,
where it was called Gesinnungsstrafrecht, translated as "criminal law
based on attitudes.
48
National Socialist scholars had rediscovered something about
crime and wrongdoing that was taken for granted in feudal culture.
The issues of loyalty and attitude were central to the limited world
44. See e.g., People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 160, 290 (1859) (reversing a murder conviction
because the shooting occurred outside the United States); State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032,
1032 (Utah 1995) (discussing whether decedent died on Utah state land, thus giving the
state courts jurisdiction over the homicide prosecution).
45. Compare Jesus's redefinition of the crime of adultery in Matthew 5:28 (New
International Version 1984) ("But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully
has already committed adultery with her in his heart.").
46. See THOMAS HOBBES, DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT
OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 107 (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971)
(1681) (noting that the crime of compassing "lyeth hidden in the Breast of him that is
Accused").
47. Georg Dahm, Verrat und Verbrechen [Treason and Felony], 95 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
DIE GESAMTE STAATSRECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 283 (1935); Roland Freisler, Der
Volksverrat, 40 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 905,907 (1935).
48. See KLAUS MARXEN, DER KAMPF GEGEN DAS LIBERALE STRAFRECHT 188
(1975).
20041 1621
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defined by lord and subject. The question we should ask about
treason today is: How did this feudal crime, based on ideas at odds
with liberal thinking, survive into the modern world?
III. FROM FEUDAL TO LIBERAL CRIMINAL LAW
In the historical transition from feudalism to liberalism, as Henry
Maine famously wrote, status gives way to contract as the primary
source of obligation.49 In broader terms, this transition means that
duties acquired at birth yield to duties freely chosen by citizens. In
the feudal law of property, the holder of an interest in land was a
vassal beholden to another. The nature of feudalism was that these
duties of fealty were imposed at birth. To know what your duties
were, you had to know your station in life.
As the liberal revolution occurred in France, the distinctive
feature of the Napoleonic legal order was the abolition of the feudal
system of estates and servitudes. The advocates of "liberty, equality,
and fraternity" recognized that the place to begin their legal reform
was in the law of real property. The French Code civil of 1804 gave
birth to a single indivisible concept of ownership in land.5" The
American Revolution took a different path. A republic took the
place of a monarchy, and therefore the system of land law dispersed
with duties to higher-ranking nobles holding reversionary interests in
the feudal chain. The freeholder in land became sovereign over his
piece of the earth's surface. This transformation in the status of
landowners had revolutionary significance. In the early stages of
American democracy, holding real property was a condition of the
right to vote.5'
The law of treason was a second area where one might have
expected a liberal transformation and abandonment of feudal
principles of obligation. But it did not happen. The offense of
treason adapted to republican forms of government. The crime of
disloyalty lives on as though it were an indispensable feature of the
landscape of criminal law. Yet we have to ask the question whether
treason survives primarily in name or whether we remain committed
to punishing disloyalty to the nation.
49. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1864).
50. CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 544 (defining property as the right to dispose of a thing
in the most complete manner possible, provided that there is no violation of statutes or
regulations).
51. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 328-36 tbls. A.1-.3 (2000).
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IV. ADAPTATIONS OF TREASON TO LIBERAL PRINCIPLES
The illiberal elements in the feudal crime of treason have led to a
number of efforts to reform the offense. The most common move is
to redefine the crime as a variation on espionage. This is the French
approach. The essence of the crime is betraying state secrets. It is
applicable to everyone, but the term "treason" is reserved for French
citizens who commit espionage.52
The blurred distinction between espionage and treason became a
critical factor in the Rosenberg case, when Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg were charged by only one witness of delivering military
secrets to the Soviets. They argued in the Supreme Court that they
could not be convicted on the testimony of a single witness because
the charge was in the nature of treason, and the Constitution requires
two witness to the overt act to establish treason. 3 Having earlier
rejected this argument, the Court approved the pending execution.54
The case testifies to the willingness of American prosecutors to rely
on charges of espionage in lieu of the procedurally more demanding
charge of treason.
The German experience goes further toward universalization of
treason than the French have done by linking the crime with
espionage. The provision of the criminal code now in force strikes
one immediately as a claim to make the crime of treason applicable to
all offenders. Anyone, foreigners as well as Germans, can commit
Hochverrat [high treason] by using force or the threat of force to
undermine the Basic Law, the German constitution. It does not
matter whether the crime is committed in Frankfurt or New York.
The temptation is to think that postwar Germans, sickened by
the nationalism of the Nazi period, eliminated the duty of national
allegiance. But things are more complicated than that. Hitler
changed the law in 1934 in the megalomaniacal belief that the whole
52. CODE PENAL [C. PaN.] §§ 411-1 to 411-3 (defining certain acts as espionage if
committed by foreigners and treason if committed by French citizens or members of the
French military).
53. See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 300 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 277-85 (summarizing the Rosenberg case's history before the Supreme
Court).
55. § 81 StGB (providing that high treason against the Federal Republic is committed
by anyone, anywhere, who "undertakes" with force or the threat of force to undermine the
constitutional order of Germany); § 82 StGB (providing that treason against a state is
committed by anyone, anyplace, who undertakes with force or the threat of force to
undermine the constitutional order of a state [Bundesland] or to seize part of its territory).
But cf § 100 StGB (limiting the offense to Germans living in Germany who take up
contacts with foreign powers for the purpose of waging war against the Federal Republic).
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world owed him a duty of loyalty.56 Still, by substituting the Basic
Law for the Fiihrer in the postwar amendment of the crime,
contemporary Germans have in effect nullified the crime of treason.
Even though the label of treason is used, the offense now resembles
the American concept of sedition57 and seeks to prevent a violent
overthrow of the government.
The two techniques, then, for liberalizing the crime are first, to
equate treason with espionage, and second, to collapse the betrayal of
the nation into disloyalty or sedition toward the established
government. Both of these techniques retain the idea that the state is
entitled to protect its secrets and its existence by threatening and
applying criminal sanctions. Though the power of states to do so is
rarely questioned, I am not sure whether the assertion rests on
neutral moral principles. States have no inherent moral justification
for their continued existence. They might be dictatorial, oppressive
regimes. Why then should they be able to claim their own criminal
law and their power to punish as legitimate instruments of self-
preservation?
A good case at the borderline of state authority to punish the
disclosure of state secrets arose in Hungary during the transition from
Communism to democracy. While the "round table" negotiations
between the Communist Party and the democratic forces were going
in the late 1980s, the Hungarian security police, the local version of
the KGB, taped the negotiations. A member of the secret police
named Mikl6s Vrgvdri had a crisis of conscience about this duplicity.
He decided to switch to the other side and invited a television crew
into the inner sanctum of the ministry to photograph secret files.
Later, after the transition to democracy, the chief prosecutor
confronted the question whether he should prosecute Vgvdri for
disclosing state secrets. In the end he decided that the rule of law
mandated prosecution and the trial proceeded. The military court
reached a compromise verdict.5 8
56. The relevant changes occurred in the Gesetz zur Anderung von Vorschriften des
Strafrechts und des Strafverfahrens [Statute for the Amendment of Provisions of Criminal
Law and Procedure], v. 2.5.1934 (RGBI. I S.341), reprinted in DIE STRAFGESETZGEBUNG
DER JAHRE 1931 BIS 1935 [Legislation for the Years 1931-1935] (Ernst Schafer & Hans V.
Dohanyi eds., 1936).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2000) (defining seditious conspiracy as two or more persons who
conspire "to overthrow the government of the United States"); see Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding convictions of members of the Communist
Party for "conspiracy ... to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force").
58. For additional details about the case, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC
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We can justify this prosecution only by assuming that every
government, even a dying Communist government, is entitled to have
its secrets protected. It can justify prosecution, as it were, from the
grave. This seems a bit arbitrary, but the alternative proposition is
also problematic, the claim that anyone can justify disclosing secrets
for a good cause.
The case that comes closest to testing this claim in the American
experience is the prosecution and conviction of Jonathan Pollard, an
intelligence officer who sold secrets to our military ally Israel. 9 If the
principle of lesser evils could justify V6gviri, it could apply with equal
force on behalf of Pollard. That outcome is hardly attractive. It
might be better to stick with an absolute rule about protecting state
secrets, even if the result is that some unappealing states-such as
Communist Hungary-are thereby protected.
V. THE FUTURE OF TREASON
The United States now finds itself in an ambivalent position with
regard to the duties of its citizens and nationals toward the nation. It
expects people to be loyal to the country, even if that requires
suppression of dissent. The Attorney General has played the
"loyalty" card to criticize those who disagree with governmental
policies that impinge on civil liberties.6° American civil society has
endorsed this general demand for loyalty, as evidenced by the
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 18-19 (1996).
59. Pollard was arrested on November 21, 1985, on charges of espionage; he was
accused of selling U.S. intelligence to Israel. See Philip Shenon, Navy Employee Arrested
as Spy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1985, at Al. In discussing the issues raised by this case of an
ally spying on another ally, Bernard Weintraub pointed out:
Both nations are, of course, sovereign. Their respective interests, while rarely
colliding, sometimes diverge. The Israelis, for example, have been frustrated by
the refusal of the United States to provide certain information on troop
deployments by moderate Arab countries, including Jordan and Egypt.
Moreover, some Israelis have said that the United States declined to turn over all
the intelligence data that would be helpful in protecting Israel.
Bernard Weintraub, The Darker Side of U.S.-Israeli Ties Revealed, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1986, at B9.
60. During a December 6, 2001, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Ashcroft's
proposed antiterrorism measures, the Attorney General remarked:
[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity
and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies and
pause to America's friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent
in the face of evil.
DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, 107th
Cong. 313 (2001) (Sup. Doc. No. Y 4.J 89/2:S.HRG. 107-704) (statement of John Ashcroft,
Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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difficulty that television satirist Bill Maher encountered after he made
a "politically incorrect" comment about the attacks of 9/11.61
The surge of patriotism in the United States has expressed itself
in the apparent decline of multiculturalism.62 It was not too long ago
that Muhammed Ali could gain the sympathy at least of liberals for
resisting the draft and grounding in his decision in discrimination
against African Americans.63 I don't think the same argument would
appeal to so many today. Hyphenated identity now seems to mean
less than it did before 9/11. The overriding principle is loyalty to the
nation and a passionate renewal of the belief that we are all
Americans.
At the same time that patriotism is ascendant, the law of treason
is on the wane. The decision not to prosecute John Walker Lindh for
treason is symptomatic. Of significance, also, is the absence of
significant appellate decisions in the entire sixty-year period since the
World War II cases.' It is worth noting this correlation, though it is
unlikely that the relationship is causal.
It may be as well that nations secure in their identity tend to
abandon the use of the feudal crime of treason. The new post-
Communist states of Eastern Europe readily invoke treason charges
61. Maher's comment was made on September 17, 2001, during an on-air conversation
with conservative commentator Dinesh D'Souza on Maher's political talk show, Politically
Incorrect. Celestine Bohlen, In New War on Terrorism, Words Are Weapons, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at All. Regarding President Bush's then-recent characterization of
the 9/11 hijackers as cowards, Maher said, " 'We have been cowards, lobbing cruise
missiles from 2,000 miles away. That's cowardly.' " Id. (quoting Politically Incorrect
(ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 2001)). Two days later, Sears and Federal Express
withdrew their advertising from the show, and despite Maher's subsequent public
apologies, several ABC affiliates refused to continue airing Politically Incorrect (although
some later relented). Id. Then, in a September 26 press briefing, Ari Fleischer, the White
House press secretary, "denounced Mr. Maher, saying of news organizations, and all
Americans, that in times like these 'people have to watch what they say and watch what
they do.' " Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, In Patriotic Time, Dissent Is Muted, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at Al. Politically Incorrect, which had run on ABC since 1997, was
bumped from its time-slot in 2002, and Maher's ABC contract was quietly allowed to
expire, as he had predicted it would. Don Kaplan, Maher Expects To Be Axed, N.Y. POST,
Nov. 8, 2001, at 82; Lisa de Moraes, The TV Column, WASH. POST, June 29, 2002, at Cl.
62. On the distinction between loyalty and patriotism, see FLETCHER, supra note 2, at
62-65. Loyalty is closely connected to the idea of law (lex, loi) while patriotism is a
romantic passion that inclines people to break the law.
63. Muhammad Ali-The Measure of a Man, 7 FREEDOMWAYS 101, 101-02 (1967)
(praising Muhammad Ali's refusal to be inducted and quoting Ali on the issue's cover as
saying, "No, I am not going 10,000 miles to help murder and kill and burn other people
simply to help continue the domination of white slavemasters over dark people the world
over. This is the day and age when such evil injustice must come to an end."); see Gene
Marine, Nobody Knows My Name, RAMPARTS, June 1967, at 11.
64. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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to support their fledgling democracies .6  The Russians even
prosecute people for treason if they share too much information with
foreign journalists that is disparaging to national pride.66 Insecure
states are more likely to sense betrayal and to invoke criminal
sanctions as a way of demonstrating their supremacy over threats
from within. More secure states, such as the United States, might find
that they can live quite well without the crime of treason.
For various reasons the government will probably not bring
another treason prosecution for many years to come, if ever. For one,
the notion of the enemy seems to presuppose a declared war, and
Congress now delegates military authority to the President without
declaring war.67  Further, as the Lindh case illustrated, the
government has a whole array of other offenses at its disposal, all of
which are easier to prove in court than is treason.' The fight against
terrorism now looms larger than the problem of American allegiance
to "enemy" powers.
CONCLUSION
But these are all technical or pragmatic concerns. I believe that
there is a deeper reason for the decline of treason in the way lawyers
and judges think about mastering the problems of crime and
terrorism in the twenty-first century.
Treason belongs to an era in which crimes were understood
primarily as personal moral dramas.69 The criminal betrayed those
65. Milos Jakes and Josef Lenart, former Communist officials, were acquitted. For a
general survey of similar prosecutions in former Communist states, see Tom Humdley,
Old Crimes Still Haunt New Europe, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2003, § 1, at 1.
66. For example, Grigory Pasko was prosecuted and convicted in Vladivostock for
collaborating with Japanese journalists about Russian environmental abuses. David
Holley, Judge Paroles Russian Journalist, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at A6.
67. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 note (West 2003)) (authorizing the
president to wage war in Afghanistan).
68. On July 15, 2002, Lindh pled guilty to one count of providing service to a terrorist
organization (a felony, as the Taliban had been thus designated) and one count of carrying
explosives while doing so (a second felony). Lewis, supra note 1. He summarized his
actions in court thus: " 'I provided my services as a soldier to the Taliban last year and in
the course of doing so, I carried a rifle and two grenades.' " Id. (quoting John Walker
Lindh (July 15, 2002)). The U.S. government agreed to the bargain, dropping the
remaining nine counts in the indictment, id., while adding a proviso that "for the rest of his
life the government may immediately and unilaterally capture and detain Mr. Lindh as an
Ienemy combatant' should it determine that he has engaged in any of a score of crimes of
terrorism." Adam Liptak, Accord Suggests U.S. Prefers To Avoid Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2002, at A14.
69. Recall the place of loyalty in the Renaissance. See Chevigny, supra note 8, at 788-
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whom he hurt. As some National Socialist theories argued, all crime
was a form of treason against the collective.7" Thus, crime and
treason were emblematic of moral struggles between the community
and the deviant. This larger-than-the-incident conception of crime
was played out dramatically in court and in the rituals of punishment.
Those who perpetrated the attacks of 9/11 saw them as symbolic
victories against the despised values of the West. We saw them as the
malicious homicide of roughly three thousand people and the
meaningless destruction of the twin towers.
Though this way of addressing the problem is admittedly
speculative, my sense is that treason has declined because in the
pragmatic thinking of the West, we no longer perceive great symbolic
messages in criminal action. We now think impersonally about crime
and danger. The criminal does not betray us. He or she threatens us
with physical harm. The decline of treason expresses a general shift
in our culture away from symbolic struggles toward the systematic
and scientific control of violence.
96.
70. See supra note 47.
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